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RECENT7 CJSES
taxpayer becomes a judicial problem the courts cannot halt at the line
of no benefit in dealing with general tax levies. The logical result of
judicial intervention at all carries the boundary of supervision into all
degrees of benefit. . . . Nor can there be any logical distinction between
property which the court may think to be inadequately benefited and
property which it may deem to be the recipient of no benefit. The sup-
posed wrong to the taxpayer . . . in both instances is identical in kind."
The question of taxability of lands, with the infrequent exception of
cases of abuse of legislative authority,5 is for the legislature rather thanx
for the courts. It has been held that without valid legislative authority-
no municipality has power to exempt taxable property within its limits
from local taxation. 6 The case under consideration seems to be the
first in which Florida has departed from the general rule that property
within the limits of a municipal corporation is subject to municipal tax-
ation, even though it is so situated that it does not and cannot receive
any benefit frim the money so paid as taxes,7 to the extent of saying
that the courts are to be permitted to determine taxability of land
where there is no clear abuse of legislative authority.
Reason indicates that Florida should return to the general rule sip-
ported by a far greater weight of authority. Thus it would avoid the
confusion and impracticability of a judicial determination of a presence
or abuse of municipal benefits to unimproved lands.
s Land, Log, .& Lumber Co. et. a]. v. Brown et. al., 73 Wis. 294, 40 NW
482, 3 L.R.A. 472 (1888); Sharp's executor v. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. 223
(Ky.) (1856); William T. Martin v. William Dix, 52 Miss. 63, 24 Am.
R ep. 661 (1876); Davis v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289, 9
SE 228 (1889); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170, 27 Am..Rep. 633 (1877);
State ex rel. Davis, Attorney General et. at, v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla.
69, 120 So. 335, 64 A.L.R. 1307 (1929); Lintor v. Athens, 53 Ga. 588
(1876).
6 City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683, 23 So. 416 (1898); Hayes v.
Walker, 54 Fla. 183, 44 So. 747 (1907).
7 Kimball v. Grantsville City, supra; Callen v. City of Junction City,
43 Kansas 627, 23 Pac. 652, 7 L.R.A. 736 (1890).
TAXATION-MUNICIPAL TAX ASSESSMENTS
ENDANGERED*
In a recent action for the foreclosure of certain tax liens, the Stiprelnm
Court of Florida reversed a final decree of foreclosure rendered by the
Circuit Court of Jefferson -County, and ruled that there was no valid
levy and assessment of certain municipal taxes by the town (if Moiti-
*Certain Lots Upon Which Taxes Are Delinquent et al. v. Town of
Monticello, 31 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1947)-(Decree of Circuit Court affirmed
on first hearing; reversed on rehearing).
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cello, lilorida. This ruling holds section 192.21, Florida Statutes 19411'
whl. I% inapplicable to the levy and assessment of municipal taxes and
weakens the effect of section 165.24, Florida Statutes 1941,2 a curative
act designed to validate certain acts of cities and towns in Florida.
I F.S. 1941, s. 192.21, F.S.A.-"All taxes imposed pursuant to the
constitution and laws of this state shall be a first lien superior to all
other liens on any property against which such taxes have been assessed
which shall continue in full force and effect until discharged by payment,
and no act of omission or commission on the part of any tax assessor,
or any assistant tax assessor, or any tax collector or any board of
county commissioners, or any clerk of the circuit court, or any officer
of this state or any newspaper in which any advertisement of sale may
be published shall operate to defeat the payment of said taxes; but any
such acts of omission or commission may be corrected at any time by
the officer or party responsible for the same in like manner as is now
or may hereafter be provided by law for performing such acts In the
first place, and when so corrected they shall be construed as valid ab
initio and shall in no way affect any process provided by law for the
enforcement of the collection of any such tax, Al owners of property
shall be held to know that taxes are due and payable thereon annually,
and are hereby charged with the duty of ascertaining the amount of such
tax and paying the same before the first day of April of each year; all
provisions of law now existing or which may be hereafter enacted relat-
ing to the assessment and collection of revenue (unless otherwise speci-
fically so declared) shall be deemed and held to be directory only,
designed for the orderly arrangement of records and procedure of offi-
cers in enforcing the revenue laws of the state; bnd no assessment
shall be held invaid unless suit be instituted within sixty days from
time the assessment shall become final, and no sale or conveyance of
real or personal property for non-payment of taxes shall be held invalid
except upon proof that the property was not subject to taxation, or that
the taxes had been paid prior to sale, or that the property had been
redeemed prior to the execution and delivery of deed based upon certifi-
cate issued for non-payment of taxes- Nothing contained in this law
shall be construed as in any way affecting any suit pending on June 7,
1941, in any court of this state, or any federal court, involving any tax
lien, tax certificate or deed, nor as affecting any suit to foreclose delin-
quent taxes filed by any county or minicipality and pending in court
(in or prior to the first day in June, 1943. As amended, Laws 1943, c.
22079, s. 1."
Derivation:
Laws 1935, c. 17442, a. 2, 2A.
Laws 1929, Ex. Sess., c. 14572, a. 1.
Comp. Cen. Laws 1927, s. 894.
Laws 1925, c. 10040, s. 1.
2 F.S. 1941, a. 155.24, F.S.A.
Derivation:
omnp, Gen. Laws 1927, s, 8081,
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By its charter, 3 the town of Monticello has power by ordinanre to
levy taxes upon all property, real, personal, and mixed, within the cor-
porate limits of the town, for municipal purposes.4 The tax liens in this
case are for the non-payment of municipal taxes for the year 1926 and
the years 1928 to 1939 inclusive. The Town Council of Monticello
levied these taxes by resolution instead of by ordinance. The charter of
the town provides, "All the provisions for the State law for the enforce-
ment .and collection of State and County taxes shall avail the said
municipal government hereby created . . . .insofar as the same does not
conflict with the provisions of this charter.'" Section 165.24 declares
valid aH acts of cities and towns legally incorporated, and of the gov-
ernment and officers of the same, done under any law of the State
of Florida.6
In the first hearing of the case, the Court construed section 165.247
in conjainction with section 40 of the town charter, s and with section
192.21, which makes directory all provisions of law as to assessment
and collection of revenue,9 and concluded that "the administrative pro-
cedure relating to assessment and collection of taxes of Monticello has
become directory instead of mandatory.'' 1  In reversing this decision
on rehearing, the Court found section 165.24 "too general to be ef-
fective,"" and concluded that section 192.21 was without application as
to municipalities.
1 2
Where there is no constitutional prohibition, a legislattire may, by
retrospective statute, cure mere irregularities in prior proceedings which
do not extend to matters of jurisdiction," and ordinarily it may ratify
and validate any past act which it originally could have authorized;' 4
provided it still has the power to authorize it.'5 As early as 1900, the
Supreme Court of Florida held, "If the thing wanting . . . is something
the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with by
prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature to dis-
Rev. Gen. St. 1920, s. 1948.
Gen. St. 1906, S. 1101.
Rev. St. 1892, s. 727.
Laws 1872, c. 1885, s. 2.
3 Sp. Acts 1921, c. 9026.
4 Sp. Acts 1921, e. 9026, s. 18.
S Sp. Acts 1921, a. 9026, s. 40.
6 See Note 2, supra.
7 See Note 2, supra.
8 See Note 5, supra.
9 F.S. 1941, s. 192.21, F.S.A., as amended, Laws 1943, a. 22079, s. 1.
'0 See Note*, supra.
II See Note 2, supra.
i2 See Note*, supra.
13 Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Co. v. Belle Mead Development
Corporation, 132 Fla. 88, 182 So. 417 (1937).
14 Dover Drainage Dist. v. Pancoast, 102 Fla. 267, 135 So. 518 (1931).
15 Smith Bros. v. Williams, 100 Fla. 642, 126 So. 367 (1930).
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pense with it by subsequent statute; and if the irregularity consists in
doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing some act, which the
legislature might have made immaterial by prior law, it is equally
cnlpetent to make the same immaterial by a subsequent law."" Again,
in 1931, the Court held that where a city is given ample statutory power
to levy taxes which power is required to be exercised by the city by
ordinance instead of by resolution, the levy of taxes by resolution instead
oi by ordinance is a defect and informality which may be validated by
act of the Legislature, inasmuch as the Legislature could have provided
for the levy to be made by resolution in the first ihstance.'
7
The validity of section 192.21"1 is not questioned ;19 its application is
the subject of argument. The famous Dofnos Case20 held that section
192.21 had no application to municipal tax certificates ex proprie
vigore, and this has since been accepted without question. 21 But in the
Southwest Enterprises Case,22 the City Charter of Coral Gables con-
tained an ambulatory provision, similar to section 40 of the Monticello
charter, 23 that the general law of the State of Florida upon the subject
of taxation applies and governs in the assessment, levy and collection of
taxes in the City of Coral Gables, except as provided otherwise therein,
and the holder of a City of Coral Gables tax sale certificate was held
entitled to maintain suit under section 192.21.24 This same distinction
has been made in other cases,25 and there is no apparent reason why it
could not have been made in the present case, and thus avoid depriving
the Town of Monticello of needed revenue. In the words of Adams, J.,
who dissented upon the rehearing, "The power of tax was granted. The
power was exercised in an erroneous manner but it is not made to appear
that for such reason the taxpayer should be relieved .... "26
16 Mlddleton et al. v. City of St. Augustine et al., 42 Fla. 287, 29 So.
421 (1900).
17 Hendricks et ux. v. Town of Green Cove Springs, 103 Fla. 81, 87,
137 So. 229 (1931).
is See Note 9, supra.
19 Ridgeway v. Reese, 100 Fla. 1304, 131 So. 136 (1930); West Vir-
ginia Hotel Corporation v. W. C. Foster Co., 101 Fla. 1147, 132 So.
842 (1931); West Virginia Hotel Corporation v. Barbee, 101 Fla. 386,
134 So. 230 (1931); State ex rel. Ranger Realty Co. v. Lummus, 111 Fla.
746, 149 So. 650 (1933).
2uJ State ex reI. Dofnos Corporation v. Lehman, 100 Fa. 1401, 131 So.
333 (1930).
21 Henderson v. Boose et al., 142 Fla. 804, 196 So. 871 (1939).
22 Southwest Enterprises Inc. v. Marion F'rasse et al., 113 Fla. 770, 152
S1. 175 (1934).
21 See Note 5, supra.
21 See Note 9, supra.
21 Coral Cables Properties, Inc., et al. v. Stopler, 115 Ia. 231, 155 So.
799 r1934); Lee v. Walter-Keogh, Inc., et al., 105 Ifa. 199, 141 So. 131
(1932); MacDonald Mortgage & Realty Co. v. Tax Securities Corp., 112
?,Iia. 622, 151 So. 898 (1933).
2a See Note*, supra.
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